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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20020031-CA
vs.
ROBERT BARNEY,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Is information supplied by a single confidential informant sufficient on its own,

without corroboration by the police, to provide a substantial basis for a magistrate's
determination that there was probable cause to believe evidence of a crime would be
found at Barney's residence? This Court will invalidate a search pursuant to a warrant if
given the totality of the circumstances, the magistrate lacked a "substantial basis" for
determining that probable cause existed. State v. Doyle, 918 P.2d 141, 143, cert, denied,
925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996). In reaching this decision, this Court should consider the
affidavit in support of the warrant in its entirety. State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1102
(Utah 1985). This issue was preserved in a motion to suppress (R. 57-75).
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<

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All relevant statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

<

*

Nature of the Case
Robert Barney appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the Fourth

District Court after the entry of a conditional plea to the charge of possession with intent
to manufacture or produce a controlled substance, a third degree felony.

B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Robert Barney was charged by information filed in Fourth District Court on or

about August 18, 2000, with 1) unlawful production of marijuana, a controlled substance,

4

a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(1 )(a)(i), 2)
possession or use of marijuana, a controlled substance, in a drug free zone, a Class A
Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), and 3) unlawful

(

possession or use of drug paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a Class A Misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37a-5(l) (R. 2).
On June 20, 2001, Barney waived his right to a preliminary hearing (R. 50). On
July 10, 2001, Barney filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized as a result of the
execution of a search warrant, arguing that 1) the magistrate lacked probable cause to
i
authorize a search, 2) the affidavit in support of the search warrant did not provide
sufficient evidence to justify a search without notice of intent or authority, and 3) the
defendant's incriminating statements and actions were not attenuated from the illegal
2
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search. (R. 57-75). On July 27, 2002, the court ordered the State to file an addendum to
their response explaining "this is a very close case" since the affidavit for the search
warrant might lack independent corroboration besides the confidential informant (R. 146
at 3).
On August 22, 2001, the hearing for the motion to suppress the search warrant was
held before the Honorable Guy R. Burningham (R. 95, 147). At the hearing, the judge
denied the motion to suppress, finding that "the affidavit does set sufficient facts in the
affidavit to establish that this is probably a reliable confidential informant" (R. 147 at 10,
22).
On September 26, 2001, the case was set for Entry of Plea before the Honorable
Guy R. Burningham (R. 98). The next day, September 27, 2001, defense entered a
Request for Clarification of Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Suppress, arguing that the
Court's file "does not include the Affidavit, Warrant, and Return of Service, with
inventory" as required by Utah Code Annotated § 77-23-209, Utah Code (R. 100-101).
On October 12, 2001, the court filed the Search Warrant as requested in defendant's
Request (R. 102-103).
On October 17, 2001, Barney entered into a no-contest "Sery Plea" to the charge
of unlawful production of a controlled substance, a third degree felony conditioned on his
"right to appeal in order to present his challenge to the issuance of the search warrant"
(R. 115-125).
On November 11, 2001, Barney was sentenced to 35 days in the Utah County Jail,
ordered to pay a fine of $925, and was placed on probation for 36 months. (R. 130-133).
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On 22 June, 2000, officer Robert Welcker, presented an affidavit in support of a

<

search warrant to the Honorable Fred D. Howard sitting as a magistrate seeking a search
warrant to enter the premises Robert Barney (R. 74). "The Affidavit set forth in ten
paragraphs the reasons for requesting authority to search" (R.74).

<

"The reasons set forth in the Affidavit to justify a search of the targeted residence
come exclusively from one confidential informant" (R. 71). The sole confidential
informant "was working off charges by working for the police and therefore was not a
private citizen" (R. 88). The affiant (Officer Welcker) stated that the confidential
informant had "hundreds of experiences with marijuana and knows the substance well,"
and that the informant saw the defendant sell and grow marijuana in and around the
residence (R. 109). The confidential informant also asserted being at the residence
"several times in the past three months when individuals arriving and leaving the
residence in vehicles were transporting marijuana and paraphernalia and that individuals
at the residence have marijuana and paraphernalia secreted on their persons " (R. 109).
After receiving this information from the confidential informant, "neither officer

^

Welcker (the affiant) nor any other police officer provided the magistrate with additional
evidence to support the search, such as surveillance of the residence, evidence of
unusually high traffic, a garbage can search, a controlled buy, information from named or

i

known neighbors, etc." (R. 71).
Thereafter, on the same date, the magistrate executed a search warrant granting a
search of the described premises (R. 74). The search warrant authorized a search
"during the night time hours" and "without notice of prior intent or authority" (R. 74).
I
4
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The described premises were searched by various officers from various Utah
County police departments and the Utah County Major Crimes Task Force, with entry
being achieved at approximately 9:00 p.m. on 23 June, 2000 (R. 74). As a result of the
search, various items of personal property were seized (R. 74, 105-106). Barney seeks
suppression of such tangible evidence as well as any of his statements made to police
executing the warrant by way of his Motion to Suppress (R. 73).
The state submitted to the defendant's recitation of the facts (R. 92).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in denying Barney's motion to suppress evidence seized
during the execution of a search warrant of his premises. The affidavit in support of a
search warrant contained no evidence that any officer independently corroborated the
confidential informant's tip. The magistrate authorized a search of Barney's residence
solely on the assertions of a confidential informant's who happened to be working off
charges for the police and whose only qualification was having hundreds of past
experiences with marijuana.
Utah has adopted a totality of the circumstances test to determine whether a fair
probability exists that drugs will be obtained pursuant to a search. When the reliability of
a confidential informant has been questioned, all relevant Utah case law has provided that
some form of independent police corroboration was a significant factor in the
magistrate's proper grant of a search warrant. There is no relevant Utah case law finding
a magistrate properly granted a search warrant without independent police corroboration.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT
THE MAGISTRATE HAD SUFFICIENT PROBABLE
CAUSE TO ISSUE A SEARCH WARRANT
The trial court's denial of Barney's motion to suppress should be reversed because
the magistrate lacked the substantial basis to conclude that the affidavit adequately
established probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. The confidential
informant was on the low end of the reliability scale and the informant's assertions were
not corroborated in any manner.
For a magistrate to determine there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place, he must look at "all the circumstances set forth in the
affidavit, including the veracity and basis of knowledge" of the informant. Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). The court pays great deference to a judicial

{

determination of probable cause. State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 129 (Utah 1987).
When an affidavit for a search warrant relies solely on a confidential informant,
additional corroboration of the informant's assertions are essential to establish sufficient

<

probability for a magistrate to execute a search warrant. See Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)
[sufficient probability based on anonymous informant and officer corroboration]; State v.
Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1987) [sufficient probability based on reliable informant and
officer's personal knowledge that suspect was involved in drug violations]; Kaysville City
v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231, cert denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997) [reliable citizeninformant and corroboration by officer]; State v. Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332, 37 P.3d
260 [officers are expected to make significant corroborative efforts to verify informant
tips].
6
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{

A. The Confidential Informant's Reliability
The reliability of the informant one of the factors a magistrate is to consider when
determining whether there is a fair probability that evidence sought actually exists.
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. The Utah Supreme Court has devised a three part test to
determine the reliability of an informant's assertions. Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d
231, (UtahApp. 1997)
In Mulcahy, the court adopted "three factors to consider in determining the
reliability and sufficiency of [an] informant's report." Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 235. The
first factor focuses on the type of tip or informant involved. Id. The court stated that an
informant identified as a "citizen-informant" is high on the reliability scale. Id.
Anonymous tips are toward the low-end of the reliability scale. Id. A police informant
"would obviously be lower on the reliability scale than a citizen-informant" since he gains
information through involvement in criminal activity or he is motivated by gain.
Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at note 2.
The second factor is "whether the informant gave enough detail about the observed
activity to support a stop." Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 236. The court stated that a tip is more
reliable if the informant observed the details personally and there is no hint of fabrication.
Id.
The final factor is "whether the police officer's personal observations confirm the
dispatcher's report of the informant's tip." Id. The court stated that "corroboration by the
police officer means, in light of the circumstances, he confirms enough facts so that he
may reasonably conclude that the information provided is reliable and a detention is
justified." Id.
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Although the test in Mulcahy was adopted to determine an officer's reasonable
sufficiency of information to make a stop, the test reasonably extends to a magistrate's
determination of the validity of an affidavit for a search warrant when an affidavit and a
magistrate's finding of probable cause is based entirely on observations made by a single
confidential informant. In Mulcahy, the court stated that "although the necessary degree
of suspicion is lower than that necessary for probable cause to arrest, the same totality of
facts and circumstances approach is used to determine if there are sufficient and
articulable facts to support reasonable suspicion." 943 P.2d at 234. And in State v.
Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332, f [ 16-17, 37 P.3d 260 (Utah App. 2001), the court
reasoned:
The Mulcahy factors were formulated to assist in determining
whether an officer had the necessary reasonable articulable suspicion to
justify a traffic stop, we see nothing to prohibit extending the use of these
factors to determinations of probable cause in the context of information
supplied by an informant. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 234; see also Gates, 462
U.S. at 241-46 (finding probable cause existed to arrest the defendant after
examining the reliability of the informant, the content of the tip, and the
. corroborative efforts of the agent); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307,
313-14(1959).
The Mulcahy factors clearly focus on examining the totality of the
circumstances in these situations and will provide trial courts and trial
counsel assistance when faced with similar probable cause determinations
in the future."
In State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1987), the court stated that an informant
that had supplied the police "with information in the past that had resulted in several
felony arrests and convictions" was a sufficient indication of the informants reliability
and veracity. Id. at 130. But in the affidavit for the search warrant, the officer
corroborated the informant's tips. Id. at 131.
Because the confidential informant in the case at bar "was working off charges by
working for the police" (R. 88), his motivation for informing was for personal gain and
8
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

not "out of concern for the community." Malcahy, 943 P.2d at 235. Thus, his reliability
is at the low end of the scale under the Malcahy standard. Even though Officer Welcker
asserted in the affidavit that the informant "has provided reliable information in the past"
(R. 110), the informant's reliability must still be corroborated independently.

B. Corroboration by Police
Under the "totality of the circumstances" test, the reliability of the informant is but
one of the factors a magistrate is to consider when determining whether there is a fair
probability that evidence sought actually exists. Even if the court finds that the magistrate
could conclude that the confidential informant was a reliable source, Barney asserts that
the magistrate still needed additional corroboration of the informant's assertions to
support the determination that a fair probability existed that evidence of a crime would be
at Barney's residence.
"An officer's statement that affiants have received reliable information from a
credible person and believe that [drugs are] stored in a home is likewise inadequate" to
establish a substantial basis that evidence exists. Gates, 462 U.S. at 239. "Absent a risk
to public safety, we expect police officers to make significant independent corroborative
efforts to confirm information from a tip." State v. Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332 at note
8. "The magistrate must not merely ratify the bare conclusions of others." State v.
Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah App. 1992)
In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), an Illinois police department received an
anonymous letter including statements that a husband and wife were heavily involved in
drug trade. Id. at 225. The letter stated that the wife would drive a car to Florida to be
loaded with drugs while the husband would fly down and drive the car back. Id. Acting
9
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on this information, arrangements for surveillance of the defendant's flight were made by
the DEA. Gates, 462 U.S. at 225. The surveillance disclosed "that the husband took the
flight, stayed overnight in a motel room registered in the wife's name, and left the
following morning with a woman in a car bearing an Illinois license plate issued to the
husband, heading north on an interstate highway used by travelers to the Bloomingdale
area." Id. at 213. With this information, a search warrant was obtained. Id. at 226.
The Court stated that the anonymous letter alone would not provide the basis for a
magistrate to issue the search warrant. Gates, 462 U.S. at 227. The Court adopted a
"totality of the circumstances" test to determine if a magistrate properly found probable
cause to issue a search warrant. Id. at 230-231. Explaining this test, the Court stated:
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense
decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him,
including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay
information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will
be found in a particular place. Id. at 238.
The Court in dicta also explained the "limits beyond which a magistrate may not
venture when issuing a search warrant." Gates, 462 U.S. at 239. "An officer's
statement that affiants have received reliable information from a credible person and

(

believe that [drugs are] stored in a home is likewise inadequate." Id. The Court
expounded on the importance of corroborating evidence when applying the totality of
circumstances test. Id. at 241. The Court cited Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307

<

(1959), where an officer received an informant's detailed account and description of the
suspect, which included the name, detailed description of the clothes the defendant would
be wearing on the date of his arrival, and the defendant's travel plans, including the date
and time of the defendant's arrival. Gates, 462 U.S. at 242. The officer went to the
station on the appointed morning and saw the defendant who matched the exact physical
i

10
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attributes and wearing the same clothes as identified by the informant. Id. The Court in
Draper concluded that the officer had sufficient information to justify further
investigation. Id.
The Court in Gates held that the magistrate could rely upon the anonymous
informant's tip since it was corroborated by the DEA. Gates, 462 U.S. at 243.
In State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 129 (Utah 1987), the defendants appealed their
convictions of possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute. The affidavit for the
search warrant stated that the informant had "supplied the police with information in the
past which has resulted in several felony arrests and convictions." Id. The affidavit also
stated that the confidential informant was at the defendant's apartment (five days previous
to the execution of the search warrant) and "saw a large quantity of marijuana which was
being sold in smaller quantities." Id. The affidavit further stipulated that the affiant was
acquainted with the defendant as the defendant had previously been arrested for drug
violations. Id.
The trial court denied the defense's motion to suppress, and the Utah Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that:
Search warrant affidavits are to be construed in a common-sense,
reasonable manner. Excessive technical dissection of an informant's tip or
of the nontechnical language in the officer's affidavit is ill-suited to this
task. In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), the Supreme Court
emphasized that an informant's "reliability" and "basis of knowledge" are
but two relevant considerations, among others, in determining the existence
of probable cause under "a totality-of-the-circumstances." They are not
strict, independent requirements to be "rigidly exacted" in every case. A
weakness in one or the other is not fatal to the warrant so long as in the
totality there is a substantial basis to find probable cause. The indicia of
veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge are nonexlcusive elements to be
evaluated in reaching the practical, common-sense decision whether, given
all the circumstances, there is a fair probability that the contraband will be
found in the place described.
Hansen, 732 P.2d 3X130.
11
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The Court in Hansen found that an affidavit for a search warrant based upon
reliable, personal information from a confidential informant and an officer's personal
knowledge that the suspect was involved in drug violations established sufficient
probability for a magistrate to conclude some quantity of drug would be found in a
search./d. at 131.
The facts and holding in State v. Vigh, 871 P.2d 1030 (Utah App. 1994), add
additional strength to the general rule that independent corroboration of an informant's
testimony is needed. Here, a confidential informant voluntarily provided detailed
information to the officer about the suspect. Id. at 1032. The informant received nothing
in exchange for the information. Id. The officer verified the informant's information and
then obtained a search warrant based on the informant's information and the officer's
verification of that information. Id. The court held that "because the confidential
informant here received nothing in exchange for information about Vigh's illegal
activities, the magistrate properly assumed that the informant was reliable.... and because
the police independently corroborated those details, the magistrate properly determined
the confidential informant was reliable.... and the magistrate had a substantial basis for
finding probable cause and issuing the search warrant." Vigh, 871 P.2d at 1034.
The facts in State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515 (Utah App. 1992), are similar to Vigh.
Here, the officer received a voluntary tip from a confidential informant. Purser, 828 P.2d
at 516. The officer personally verified the significant facts of the tip and then obtained a
search warrant.. Id. at 518. The court concluded, based on the totality of the
circumstances, that the affidavit established probable cause that drugs would be found at
defendant's residence. Id.
i
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In Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231 (Utah App. 1997), a citizen called the
police informing them a "drunk individual" had left his front door and is driving in a
"white Toyota Celica, maybe." Id. at 233. The caller informed the police in what
direction the defendant was headed and what road he was on. Id. The informant left his
name and address with the police. Id. A dispatcher in turn radioed an officer; the officer
saw the white car heading in the direction described by the informant and stopped the car
even though the officer observed no traffic violations. Id. After smelling alcohol on the
defendant's breath and conducting a field sobriety test, the officer arrested the defendant.
Id. The defendant filed a motion to suppress arguing the officer did not have reasonable
suspicion to support the stop and the trial court granted the motion. Id.
The court reversed the motion to suppress, finding that the caller, as a citizeninformant, was high on the reliability scale, that the informant supplied sufficient detail to
support a stop, and that the officer satisfactorily corroborated the informant's report.
Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 238. The court stated that the officer had identified a similar make
of the car on the same road and direction that the informant reported within a few minutes
of the report. Id.
In State v. Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332 at 12, the Salt Lake County Sheriff's
Office received a report from an unidentified informant of a forgery in progress at a bank.
The informant identified the suspect as Hispanic male and identified the clothes he was
wearing. Id. at \ 2. A deputy arrived at the bank and immediately noticed Valenzuela as
the person described in the report. Id. A bank teller also pointed the deputy in the
direction of Valenzuela. Id. The deputy believed Valenzuela to be the suspect and
approached him and placed him in custody for "safety reasons." Id. at f 3. The deputy
then searched Valenzuela and found him in possession of methamphetamine. Id.
13
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The court found that the officer's failed to investigate further to determine whether
any criminal activity occurred. Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332 at f 30. The court stated,
"absent a risk to public safety, we expect police officers to make significant independent
corroborative efforts to confirm information from a tip prior to detaining a suspect." Id. at
note 8. The court reversed the conviction concluding that under the totality of the
circumstances, there was not probable cause to detain Valenzuela because the informant
was on the low end of the reliability scale, the informant gave little information, and the
officer failed to investigate finding that the deputy lacked sufficient information to
support an independent judgment of probable cause to place Valenzuela in custody. Id.
at 131-32.
The above cases establish that where an affidavit for a search warrant relies upon
one single informant, additional independent corroboration other than a reliable
informant's testimony is essential to establish sufficient probability to execute a search
warrant. The reliability is but one of the factors a magistrate is to consider under the
"totality of the circumstances." In the case at bar, the affidavit for the search warrant
relied solely on a single confidential informant's testimony regarding the informant's
personal presence at Barney's residence where marijuana was allegedly present (R. 107110). The affiant did not provide any additional corroboration to the informant's
testimony (R. 71, 107-110). Thus, the magistrate made the decision to issue a search
warrant solely on the testimony of a confidential informant who was "working of charges
by working for the police and therefore was not a private citizen" (R. 88). Moreover,
the only qualification possessed by the informant was his knowledge of marijuana based
on "hundreds" of experiences with it. In all of the above cited cases, officers had to
provide some sort of corroborating evidence before a finding of sufficient probable cause.
i
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See also State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1985) [officer verified significant
facts of informant's tip].
Accordingly, Barney asserts that this Court should reverse the denial of his motion
to suppress because, given the totality of the circumstances-namely the inherent
unreliability of the confidential informant and a lack of police corroberation-the
magistrate lacked a substantial basis to conclude that the affidavit adequately established
probable cause of illegal activity for the issuance of a search warrant. Barney further
asserts that any evidence obtained as a result of the warrant must be excluded as fruits of
the poisonous tree.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Barney asks that this Court reverse the trial court's
erroneous denial of his motion to suppress and asks that the matter be remanded to the
Fourth District Court with instructions that his plea should be withdrawn and the
information dismissed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of June, 2002.

Margaret P//Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief Of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South,
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.o H. MEANS
_AH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
/'Attorneys for Defendant
^
245 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah, 84601
,
.
(801)379-2570
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Ql •." . ' C: F,';' 5 : 0 7
W^
^

CASE NUMBER: 001403161

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MOTION TO SUPPRESS
and MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT THEREOF

vs.
ROBERT BARNEY,

Hon. Guy R. Burningham
Defendant.

MOTION
COMES NOW, Defendant, ROBERT BARNEY, by and through his
attorney of record, Thomas H. Means, and pursuant to Rule 12 of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, who hereby moves for this
Court's Order suppressing all evidence seized as a result of the
execution of a search warrant on or about 23 June, 2000, at 1136
South State Road #198, Payson, Utah. Support for this Motion is
more particularly set forth in the accompanying Memorandum of
points and authorities.
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MEMORANDUM
Defendant respectfully submits the following points and
authorities in support of his Motion to Suppress:
Facts Relevant to this Motion
On 22 June, 2000, officer Robert Welker, in an action
entitled STATE OF UTAH v NARCOTICS INVESTIGATION 1136 South State
Road #198 Payson, Utah, presented an AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF A
SEARCH WARRANT to the Honorable Fred D. Howard sitting as a
magistrate seeking a search warrant to enter the premises at that
address, [A copy of such Affidavit is attached hereto as an
exhibit.] The Affidavit set forth in ten (10) paragraphs the
reasons for requesting authority to search. Thereafter, on the
same date, the magistrate executed a SEARCH WARRANT allowing for
a search of the

described premises. The SEARCH WARRANT

authorized a search "during the night time hours" and "without
notice of prior intent or authority". [A copy of said SEARCH
WARRANT is likewise attached hereto.]
The described premises were searched by various
officers from various Utah County police departments and the Utah
County Major Crimes Task Force, with entry being achieved at
approximately 9:00 p.m. on 23 June, 2000. As a result of the
search, various items of personal property were seized. Defendant
seeks suppression of such tangible evidence as well as any of his
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statements made to police executing the warrant by way of his
Motion to Suppress.
Questions Presented
1) Were the factual assertions set forth in the
Affidavit sufficient for the magistrate to have independently
concluded that there was a fair probability contraband would be
found in the targeted Premises?
2) Was There Legal Authority for the Search Warrant to
authorize a search of the targeted premises without notice of
prior intent or authority?
3) Were Defendant's statements attenuated from the
effects of the illegal search?
Standard of Review
The United States Supreme Court has adopted a "totality of
the circumstances" test to determine if a magistrate properly
found probable cause to issue a search warrant.1 In so holding
the Court directed that "[a] magistrate's 'determination of
probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing
courts. 1 " 2 " f A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts
toward warrants,1 is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's
strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant;

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
2

Gates, above, citing Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
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'courts should not invalidate warrant[s] by interpreting
affidavit [s] in a hyper technical, rather than a common sense,
manner.'"3
While the United States Supreme Court has required that an
affidavit provide only a "substantial basis for ... concluding
that a search warrant would uncover evidence of wrongdoing", and
that "[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a
practical, common sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, ... there is
a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular placet,]" the Court also stressed that
"[i]n order to ensure that ... an abdication of a magistrate's
duty does not occur, courts must continue to conscientiously
review the sufficiency of affidavits on which warrants are
issued." 4
The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule was made applicable
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.5 The Utah Supreme
Court has recognized this review-of-warrants test articulated by
the United States Supreme Court.6

Gates, above, citing United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
4

Gates, above.
5

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

6

State v^_ Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983); State L . Anderson, 701 P.2d
1099 (Utah 1985); State v^_ Babbell, 770 P.2d 987 (1989); State v^ Thurman, 846P.2d 1256.
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Argument
As a preface to substantive argument, Defendant asserts that
the evidence seized as a result of execution of the above-noted
Search Warrant should be suppressed unless the original
Affidavit, Search Warrant, and Return of Service are made a part
of this file.
1. The affidavit did not sufficiently establish the credibility
of the single confidential informant.
In this case the reasons set forth in the Affidavit to
justify a search of the targeted residence come exclusively from
one confidential informant. "Neither officer Welker (the affiant)
nor any other police officer provided the magistrate with
additional evidence to support a search, such as surveillance of
the residence, evidence of unusually high traffic, a garbage can
search, a controlled buy, information from named or known
neighbors, etc. Consequently, the information in the Affidavit is
only as good as the credibility of the informant.
Defendant is aware that in Gates7 the United State Supreme
Court specifically retreated from the hyper-technical two-pronged
Aguilar/Spenelli8 test in favor of the "totality of the
circumstances" test for assessing the reliability of information
supplied by informants used in support of requests for search

Supra.
8

Aguilar v Texas,
(1969).

378 U . S . 108

(1964); S p i n e l l i v^ United S t a t e s ,

5
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393 U . S . 4

warrants. However, neither the United States Supreme Court nor
the appellate courts of Utah have held that the reliability and
accuracy of confidential informants is unimportant, nor have any
of these courts abandoned inquiry into the credibility of
confidential informants.
First, the Gates court, itself, indicated that the
totality of'the circumstances test "includ[es] the 'veracity1 and
'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information,
...."9 Also, our Utah Supreme Court, in cases decided after Gates
and the several Utah cases which specifically recognized and
adopted the Gates test10, has held:
"even under [the Gates! standard, compliance with
the Aguilar-Spinelli guidelines may be necessary to
make a sufficient basis for probable cause. Depending
on the circumstances, a showing of the basis of
knowledge and veracity or reliability of the person
providing the information for a warrant may well be
necessary to establish with a 'fair probability' that
the evidence sought actually exists and can be found
where the informant states. In other cases, however, a
less strong showing of the basis of the affiant's
knowledge, veracity, and reliability may be required,
if the circumstances as a whole indicate that the
informant's report is truthful"11
Similarly, the Utah Court of Appeals has held that "[the AquilarSpinelli guidelines] are useful even under the totality of

o

Gates, supra.
See footnote 6, above.
1]

State v Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203 (Utah, 1984); accord State v Anderson, 701
P.2d 1099 (Utah, 1985).
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circumstances test for determining whether the facts establish
probable cause."12
From these federal and state cases dealing with informants •
it is clear that in situations such as the case at bar, where no
other evidence bolsters or corroborates the informant, the
credibility and basis of knowledge of the informant is extremely
critical to an assessment of the sufficiency of the affidavit.
When viewed in this light, the Affidavit here fails in its
attempt to establish the credibility of the sole informant.
At first blush, from the Affidavit, it would appear that the
informant had considerable knowledge of happenings within the
targeted residence. The informant claimed to have been "at" the
residence within 72 hours of presentment of the Affidavit, he
observed marijuana there, he knows marijuana was in the house as
well as a shed near the house, he knows that Defendant and
Annette Petro were distributing marijuana from the residence, he
observed Defendant sell H ounce of marijuana for approximately
$120.00, Defendant told him he was growing marijuana, and he
knows that Defendant and Annette Petro live at the residence
[Affidavit, paragraph #3]. The informant further claims to have
been "inside" the residence within 30 days of presentment of the
Affidavit and that Defendant told him he was growing marijuana in

12

State v Brown, 798 P.2d 284 (Ut. Ct. App., 1990); see also Salt Lake City v
Truiillo, 854 P.2d 603 (Ut. Ct. App., 1993), State v Singleton, 854 P.2d 1017
(Ut. Ct. App., 1993), State v Lee, 863 P.2d 49 (Ut. Ct. App., 1993).
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the house and in a barn to the rear of the house, that Defendant
also told him he grows "a lot" of marijuana and usually gets
$60.00 per 1/8 ounce, he observed wet and fresh marihuana, and
Defendant tried to sell him some marijuana [Affidavit, paragraph
#4]. Additionally, the informant claims to have been at the
residence ''several times in the past three months" and observed
individuals arriving there carrying marijuana and paraphernalia
"secreted on their persons" [Affidavit, paragraph #5]. Lastly,
the informant told Officer Welker that the "subjects" living in a
trailer next to the residence "are party to the subjects living
in the residence" [Affidavit, paragraph #6].
From this wealth of "inside" information provided by the
informant one might assume that the informant has a solid basis
of knowledge for the information he provided to Officer Welker.
But this assumption is valid only if one can also be assured that
the informant is truthful in his assertions; after all, such
assertions should be taken as true and accurate only if the
informant

is established as truthful and accurate.

As evidence of the informant's credibility, Officer Welker
swore to the magistrate that the informant "has supplied officers
of the Utah County Major Crimes Task Force with information for
the past year", "that this informant has been responsible for the
recovery of narcotics in several cases", that the information
from this informant "has always proven true through independent
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investigations by myself and other detectives of the Major Crimes
Task Force", "that this informant has provided information which
has proven to be reliable in the past", "that this informant has
never provided information that has been wrong or misleading",
and "that this informant is not a party to this investigation"
[Affidavit, paragraph #2], "that this informant has provided
information which has proven reliable in the past", "that this
informant has never provided information that has been wrong or
misleading", and "that this informant is not a party to this
investigation [Affidavit, paragraph #8].
Most of this vouching for the credibility of the informant
is stock language that appears in most (if not all) of the
Affidavits prepared by the Utah County Major Crimes Task Force
and other police agencies in Utah County. None of these
statements give a magistrate any facts from which the magistrate
can, independently,

determine, for himself or herself, that the

informant is reliable. All of the statements are conclusory
rather than factual. They do not set forth information to be
weighed by the magistrate; rather, they are unsupported
testimonials. Without specific facts, the magistrate is left only
to defer to the opinion and conclusions of the affiant. By
accepting such assertions as evidence of reliability the
magistrate abandoned neutrality and impermissibly "rubber-
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stamped" the affiant's conclusions. As the Utah Supreme Court
stated in State v Babbell, 770 P.2d 987 (Utah, 1989),
"[t]he fourth amendment requires that when a
search warrant is issued on the basis of an affidavit,
that affidavit must contain specific
facts sufficient
to support a determination by a neutral magistrate that
probable cause exists (emphasis added)(citing to State
v Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188,190 (Utah, 1986)). The affiant
must articulate particularized facts and circumstances
leading to a conclusion that probable cause exists.
Mere conclusory statements will not suffice (citing to
Gates, supra)".13
It might be argued that the following facts provided by
Officer Welker substantiated the informant's credibility: "that
the informant has had hundreds of experiences with marijuana and
knows the substance well", that the informant had claimed to have
observed the occupants of the residence distributing marijuana,
specifically a sale of H ounce for $120.00, that Defendant
admitted to the informant that he (Defendant) was growing
marijuana on the premises [Affidavit, paragraph #3], that
Defendant told the informant his "usual" price per 1/8 ounce,
that the informant observed "very wet and fresh" marijuana in the
premises, that the Defendant attempted to sell marijuana to the
informant [Affidavit, paragraph #4], that the informant was at
the house "several times in the past three months when
individuals arriving to and leaving the residence in vehicles

13

See also State v Droneburq, 781 P.2d 1303 (Ut. Ct. App., 1989;
State v Brown, 798 P.2d 284 (Ut. Ct. App., 1990; State v Rowe, 806
P. 2d 730 (Ut.-'Ct. App., 1991.
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were transporting marijuana and paraphernalia and that
individuals at the residence have marijuana and paraphernalia
secreted on their persons [Affidavit, paragraph #5], and that the
informant was aware that the subjects living in a trailer on the
premises were parties to the subjects living in the residence
[Affidavit, paragraph #6].
But, as noted above, the mere recital of multiple assertions
does not necessarily indicate the informant is truthful or
accurate in his claims. In fact, instead of indicating
credibility in the informant, the number and nature of these
claims should raise a red flag to any magistrate.
Having had "hundreds of experiences with marijuana" this
informant is very likely a felon (Section 58-37-8(2) (e)
designates a third possession of marijuana to be a third degree
felony). Has this informant's ability to perceive, remember, or
relate facts been effected by drug use? From the informant's
reports of hundreds of drug experiences as well as exposure to
other's drug sales and use as well as incriminating admissions by
the Defendant, it is obvious that this informant is, himself,
deeply involved in the drug culture to the point that others are
supposedly willing to commit criminal acts openly in his
presence(one doesn't normally and repeatedly stumble into the
types of situations described by this informant). This informant
may have been "earning" a plea bargain or avoiding prosecution
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himself; if so, this added motivation should have been known by
and considered by the magistrate. It is unlikely that a person as
openly involved in criminal activity as this informant claims to
be was providing information to the police out of a sense of
civic mindedness. Because this informant is not of the class of
informants for whom the magistrate might assume reliability and
truthfulness14 some indicia of motivation should be included in
the Affidavit. Yet, the Affidavit provides no reason for the
informant's cooperation with the police.

~ ..

Admittedly Gates directs that reviewing magistrates are not
to take a hyper-critical approach to requests for search
warrants. But, neither are magistrates expected to abandon

all

critical thought or common sense or neutrality when reviewing
such requests. Where, as here, the total basis for the request
for a search warrant originates in a confidential informant, the

Utah appellate court have, on several occasions, recognized that "citizen"
informants used in affidavits for search warrants can be presumed reliable. A
review of these holdings indicates that there is no bright-line definition of
"citizen" in this context. However, dicta from these cases is informative.
Generally, a citizen informant is one who receives nothing in exchange for
information, reveals his/her name or identity through the affiant to the
magistrate or is a neighbor or a family member or in some other way is
identifiable, has no criminal record that would suggest unreliability,
participates in controlled buys, or whose information is strongly corroborated
in all of its critical detail. The magistrate in this case did not have the
benefit of any of this type of information in the Affidavit
presented to him.
See, for example State v Harris, 671 P.2d 175 (Utah, 1983); State v Treadwav 499
P.2d 846 (Utah, 1972); State v Miller, 740 P.2d 1363 (Ut. Ct. App., 1987); State
v Stromberq, 783 P.2d 54 (Ut. Ct. App., 1989); State v Brown, 798 P.2d 284 (Ut.
Ct. App., 1990); State v Purser, 828 P.2d 515 (Ut. Ct. App., 1992); State v
White, 851 P.2d 1195 (Ut. Ct. App., 1993); State v Blaha, 851 P.2d 1205 (Ut. Ct.
App., 1993); State v Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203 (Utah, 1984); State v Potter, supra;
State v Viqh, supra; State v Yoder, 935 P.2d 534 (Ut. Ct. App., 1997).
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magistrate should expect to be presented with specific
articulated facts assuring him of the informant's credibility,
basis of knowledge, and reliability free from ulterior
motivation. And, where, as here, factual evidence of the
informant's reliability is insufficient, the magistrate is not
being hyper-critical by refusing to grant the warrant. Because
the Affidavit in this case does not adequately support the
reliability and credibility of the informant upon whom the
information asserted rests, the warrant was improvidently issued
and should be suppressed by this Court.
2. The Affidavit did not provide evidence sufficient to justify a
search without notice of intent or authority.
Utah Code Section 77-23-210(2) allows a magistrate to
authorize a no-knock entry "only upon proof, under oath, that the
object of the search may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or
secreted, or that physical harm may result to any person if
notice were given." The affiant lists five reasons why authority
to execute the warrant without notice was sought: 1)certain
persons lived in a trailer on the target property who might alert
the occupants of the house to the officers1 presence, 2) two
schools are situated directly across the street [Affidavit,
paragraph #6] 3) the sought-after contraband might be destroyed,
4) the suspected illegal activity occurred mostly'during evening
hours, and, 5) in the affiant's experience persons involved with
distribution of narcotics "often" have weapons and surveillance
13
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equipment [Affidavit, paragraph #7]. None of these five cited
reasons justified no-knock authority.
Besides stating that "subjects" live in a trailer next to
the target residence and that they are "party" to the occupants
of the house, the Affidavit does not explain how such "subjects"
could or would give an alert that would be any different than an
alert given by the searching officers' knocking and announcing
their authority and purpose to search. Despite the informant's
supposed extensive contact with the occupants of the target
residence, the informant gives no detail about how those who were
in the trailer were "party" to those in the house such as their
identities, the extent of their observed conduct, anyone's
statements, or even whether the people from the trailer had ever
been seen in the house, etc. It is unclear what is meant by the
label of "party" beyond mere casual acquaintance or possibly

"

tenant. It is thus unproved that the people from the trailer were
motivated to alert the occupants of the house to an attempt to
serve a warrant. It is also unclear, assuming the people from the
trailer were inclined to interfere with the police's service of
the warrant, how it is suspected they would do so. No information
is given regarding the positioning of the trailer in respect to
the anticipated approach of the officers to the house, lines of
sight from the trailer, etc. Without these necessary facts the
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magistrate could only assume interference from the people in the
trailer.
Service of the warrant was achieved on 22 June, 2000.
Nothing in the warrant indicated that school was in session on
that date as opposed to being on Summer hiatus. Service at night
was sought and authorized. Service was actually achieved at 9:00
p.m., well after normal school hours or when children might be
expected to be on the school grounds. Nothing about the timing of
the search or the location of the schools justified entry without
notice. In fact, as the facts indicate, there was a reasonable
alternative to no-knock authority, i.e. simply to time execution
of the warrant when children aren't expected to be present.
If the informant is to be believed, the affiant expected to
find growing marijuana plants in the residence as well as around
the residence, in a shed near the house, and in a barn to the
rear of the house. Neither the informant nor the affiant
explained to the magistrate how this contraband could be "easily
secreted, destroyed, damaged, or otherwise altered" as asserted
in paragraph #7. It appears the affiant merely parroted the
statutory language in the request for no-knock authority without
detailing or explaining how the suspected contraband might be
destroyed.
While-the affiant asserts that "[t]he informant observed the
illegal activity occurring mostly during the evening hours" in
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paragraph #7, the paragraphs setting forth the informant's
specific observations [#3,#4,#5,#6] do not indicate the time of
any alleged illegal activity. Additionally, it is hard to
understand how the suspected growing of marijuana can occur
"mostly in the evening hours".
Lastly, the affiant's personal experience that other persons
involved with narcotics "often" have weapons and surveillance
equipment is an unscientific sampling that can't be taken as
probative of the actions of all narcotics users, generally, or of
this Defendant, specifically. Does "often" mean 2% or 98%; the
magistrate can only guess from this statement. Moreover, such
apocryphal information is irrelevant here as, if the informant is
to be believed, even after his claimed extensive exposure in, to,
and around the residence, its occupants, the people from the
adjacent trailer, and many visitors, the informant makes ho
mention of any weapons or surveillance equipment. In this
counsel's experience, this is another example of "stock" language
that often appears in search warrant affidavits filed in this
District which appears to be used to justify searches and night
time or no-knock authority when case specific facts don't
otherwise exist.
The Affidavit did not justify the searching officers to vary
from the requirement that they give notice of their authority and
purpose and wait to be admitted with reasonable promptness,
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spelled out in Section 77-23-210 (1). Accordingly, the evidence
seized pursuant to service of this Search Warrant should be
suppressed even if the Affidavit set forth probable cause to
suspect contraband was on the premises.
3. Defendant's incriminating statements and actions were not
attenuated from the illegal search.
From the police incident reports provided to Defendant it is
anticipated that testimony would establish that Defendant made
voluntary statements to certain police officers and also
voluntarily pointed out the existence of contraband in the house
after service of the Search Warrant. Should this Court determine
that the Affidavit lacked probable cause or was wrongfully served
without notice of authority and intent, evidence of Defendant's
incriminating statements and actions should nevertheless be
suppressed, even though voluntary, because they were not
attenuated from the preceding police illegality.
"[A] defendant's consent to a search following illegal
police activity is valid under the Fourth Amendment only if. both
of the following tests are met: (i) The consent was given
voluntarily, and (ii) the consent was not obtained by police
exploitation of the prior illegality."15 As the Utah Supreme
Court explained in Arroyo, this need for attenuation of consent
from antecedent police illegality has its roots in the "fruit of

15

State v Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah, 1990); State v
:J
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1262 (Utah, 1993).
'
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the poisonous tree doctrine" of Wong Sun v United States, 371
U.S. (1963). Attenuation occurs only when circumstances
remove any taint of the police illegality from the consent. The
Utah Supreme Court has explained that the test for determining
that a•consent has been sufficiently attenuated from a prior
police illegality is 1) the purpose and flagrancy of the wrong,
2) temporal proximity of the wrong and the consent, and 3)
intervening factors.16
In this case the first factor probably weighs in favor of
the State as the police were neither blatant nor abusive in their
wrongfulness. However, the*second two factors weigh for the
Defendant because the Defendant's consent occurred while many
police remained in his house, while Defendant was detained (if
not in custody), moments after entry into his home, without the
existence of intervening factors such as consultation with an
attorney. Defendant's incriminating statements and actions were
not removed from the taint of the illegal entry into his home.
Consequently, the fruits of such statements and actions should be
suppressed.
Conclusions.
The Affidavit seeking a Search Warrant in this case lacked
probable cause because the sole confidential informant upon whom
the Affidavit was primarily based was not proved believable.

16

Thurman, supra.
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There was not evidence sufficient to justify no-knock entry into
Defendant's residence. Defendant's incriminating statements and
actions were fruit of the police illegality. All evidence derived
as a direct or indirect result of the service of the subject
Search Warrant should therefore be suppressed and ruled
inadmissable at the trial of this matter.
Respectfully submitted this 10th day of July, 2001.

Thomas H. Means
Attorney for
Robert Barney

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY/MAILING
I hereby certify that on the /p

day of July, 2001, I

hand-delivered or mailed with postage pre-paid a copy of the
foregoing to the following:

Carlyle K. Bryson
Utah County Attorney
100 East Center
Suite 2100
Provo, Utah, 84601
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KAY BRYSON
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY
100 E. CENTER, SUITE 2100
PROVO, UTAH
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FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

:

-vs-

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
A SEARCH WARRANT

^ A\\W

:

NARCOTICS INVESTIGATION
1136 South State Road 198
Payson, Utah
84651

:

Criminal No
:

Defendants
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF UTAH

:ss .
)

Comes now Robert Welcker, having been duly sworn, who deposes and
states as follows:
1.

I am a police officer for the city of American Fork, I have been a
peace officer since 1994. That I am a graduate of the Utah Police
Academy (POST) and have received specialized training for law
enforcement work including training specific to narcotics work.
I am currently assigned to the Utah County Major Crime Task I have
been investigating narcotics since 1998.
I am certified as a
clandestine lab first responder..
I have work several hundred
narcotic cases and I have worked with dozens of confidential
informants.

That within the past 72 hours your affiant has received information
from a reliable confidential informant who has provided reliable
information in the past. That this reliable confidential informant
has supplied officers with the Utah County Major Crimes Task Force
with information'-for the past year. That this informant has been
responsible for the recovery of narcotics in several cases. That
this information supplied by this informant has always been proven
true through independent
investigations by myself and other
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(

detectives of the Major Crimes Task Force. That this informant has
provided information which has proven to be reliable in the past.
That this informant: has never provided information that has been
wrong or misleadir.c.
That this informant is not party to this

litigation.

<

DISCOVERY SENT TO
DEFEWSF ATTORMF* ,

That this reliable confidential informant told your affiant that
°$
within the past 72 hours the informant was at the residence located
*A
at 1136 South State Road #198 Payson, Utah.
That while at the < ^ V
residence the informant did observe a substance known to the ^
informant as marijuana inside the residence. That the informant has
had hundreds of experiences with marijuana and knows the substance
well. That the marijuana was located in the residence and in a shed
near the house. That the informant did tell your affiant that the
owners of the residence, Robert Barney and Annette Petro are
distributing marijuana from the residence. That within the past 72
hours the informant did observe Robert Barney sell a quantity of
approximately % ounce to an individual for approximately 120
dollars. That Robert Barney did tell the informant that he is
growing his own marijuana in and around the residence. That this
informant knows Robert Barney and Annette Petro to live in the
residence at 1136 South SR #198.

c:-r riffHai Furocses Only
_
K ^ ; - a - i 3v The County Attorney To
Sichaei Espiin __£CTJJjOQ{LThat within the past 3 0 days the reliable confidential informant was
inside the residence with Annette Petro and Robert Barney. That
while in the house Robert Barney did tell your informant that he is
growing marijuana in his house and in a barn to the rear of the
house. That Robert Barney did tell your informant that he sells
a lot of marijuana and that he usually gets $60.00 per 1/8 ounce
sold. That your informant did observe marijuana in the residence and
that it was very wet and fresh. That Robert Barney did attempt to
sell a quantity of marijuana to the confidential informant.
That this informant stated that the informant has been at the
residence several times in the past three months when individuals
arriving to and leaving the residence in vehicles were transporting
marijuana and paraphernalia and that individuals at the residence
have marijuana and paraphernalia secreted on their persons. That
failure to search persons at and arriving to the residence during
the execution of this warrant as well as vehicles associated with
people present or % arriving to the address of 20 north 100 west #6
American Fork, Utah will result in officers missing valuable
evidence pertinent to this investigation. cp,Q riCCjf'iM pf I D D H ^ C Q p M j Y

That the informant told your affiant that the subjects living in a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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trailer next to the residence are party to the subjects living in
the residence at 1136 south SR #198 . That if notice of intent is
given that officers safety will be at risk due to the
subjects
living in the trailer next to the residence may alert the oersons
living at 1136 south SR#193. That the residence is located across
the street from Two separate schools located directly east of the
residence located at 1136 south SR #198. That serving this warrant
in the nighttime hours will afford a safer environment for children
in the area attending these schools or frequenting the school
playgrounds. Therefore your affiant respectfully request permission
to serve this warrant during the nighttime hours and without; i^^e^trf ~ f O
or authority to allow a window of safety fe^^fC^^a^^ln^Slor7, ± j '
chUdren in the area.
^CPPNfiF'^TTOffl^
That the amount of narcotics observed in the residence is an amount
large enough for distribution but small enough to be easily
secreted, destroyed, damaged or otherwise altered if notice of
intent or authority is given. That the amount of narcotics observed
can also be secreted, destroyed, damaged or otherwise altered if
notice of intent or authority is given. That the informant observed
the illegal activity occuring mostly during the evening hours. That
it is your affiants experience that persons involved with the
distribution of narcotics often have weapons and surveillance
equipment to protect themselves from police and other persons
selling drugs in competition with themselves.

That this informant has provided information which has proven to be
reliable in the past. That this informant has never provided
information that has been wrong or misleading. That this informant
is not party to this investigation.
For Official Purposes Only

Retaer-&d By The County Attorney To
Michael tsplin
nnT , ,
m
Your affiant believes that failure to search the residence,
outbuilding, curtilage, and persons and vehicles of individuals
present and arriving to the residence of 113 6 south SR# 198 Payson,
Utah will result in officers missing valuable evidence pertinent to
this investigation. Your affiant expects to locate the following
items, marijuana, paraphernalia, buy-owe sheets, cash, packaging
material, scales, items used for the ingestion or cultivation of the
above mentioned narcotics and other items associated with the
use/distribution of controlled substances and related paraphernalia.

FOR OFFICIAL PURPOSES ONLY
Released by the County Attorney tc
UBLIC DEFENDER

MAR 2-3:2(301

The residence is more particularly described as single family
dwelling facing to the east and is on the west side of State Road
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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#198. That the residence is grayish green in color and the outside
of the house is made of a slat tile. The house is the second house
south of 1070 south on the west side of SR #198. That there is a
brown and creme trailer parked to the rear of the house near the
south , west corner. The house number 1136 is displayed on the front
porch on a awning support pole and the numbers are made of wood,
white in color.

Wherefore, your affiant requests that a warrant be issued by this
court authorizing a search of the residence, together with the curtilage,
outbuildings,
and persons and vehicles of individuals present and
arriving to the residence of 113 61 South SR#198 Payson, Utah for the
following items, narcotics, marijuana, paraphernalia, buy-owe sheets,
electronic equipment, cash, packaging material, scales, items used for
the ingestion or the cultivation of the above mentioned narcotics and
other items associated with the use/distribution of controlled substances
and related paraphernalia.
Dated this

7

71£-

day of June 2000 <0_.M.

Subscribed and sworn before me on the
June 2000, £ f ^ 7

/l.M.

For Official Purposes Only
Released By The County Attorney To
Michael £spi5r
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KAY BRYSON
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY
10 0 EAST CENTER, SUITS 210 0
PROVO, UTAH 84 601
PHONE: (801) 370-8026
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FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY

ireNSEATTORMg

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

US-

vs.

SEARCH WARRANT

NARCOTICS INVESTIGATION
1136 South State Road 198
Payson, Utah 84651

m

Criminal No.

Defendants

prtf nfi\r\*\ PyrDOSSS or
P ^ ^ s e c ^ B y The County Attorney To
Michael Espiin OOTA1I0G0

THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER OF THE STATE OF UTAH:
Magistrate's
Endorsement

It has been established by oath or
affirmation made or submitted to me this
-TC?^ day of June 2000, that there is probable
cause to believe the following:
The property described below:
was unlawfully acquired or unlawfully possessed;
has been used or is possessed for the purpose of being
used to commit or conceal the commission of an offense;
or
is evidence of illegal conduct.
The property described below is most probably located at
the premises also set forth below.
The person or entity in possession of the property is a
party to the alleged illegal conduct. *
That this warrant may be served without notice of prior
intent or authority due to the fact that items sought
may be easily secreted, disposed of, destroyed or
otherwise altered if notice of intent or authority is
given. That execution of this warrant without notice of
intent or authority will afford officers a window of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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safety while securing the residence.
NOW, THEREFORE, YOU AND EACH OF YOU, are hereby directed to search the
residence as more particularly described as single family dwelling facing
to the east and is on the west side of State Road
#198. That the
residence is grayish green in color and the outside of the house is made
of a slat tile. The house is the second house south of 1070 south on the
west side of SR #198. That there is a brown and creme trailer parked to
the rear of the house near the south , west corner. The house number 1136
is displayed on the front perch on a awning support pole and the numbers
are made of wood, white in color.
That you are also hereby directed to search the residence together with
the curtilage, outbuildings,
and persons and vehicles of individuals
present and arriving to the residence of 1136 South SR #198 Payson, Utah
for the following items, narcotics, marijuana, paraphernalia, buy-owe
sheets, electronic equipment, cash, packaging material, scales, items
used for the ingestion and cultivation of the above mentioned narcotics
and other items associated with the use/distribution of controlled
substances and related paraphernalia.
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IF YOU FIND THE DESCRIBED PROPERTY, you are directed to bring the
property forthwith before me at the above Court or to hold the same in
your possession pending further order of this court. You are instructed
to leave a receipt for the property with the person in whose possession
the property is found or at the premises where the property was located.
After execution of the warrant you shall promptly make a verified return
of the warrant to me together with a written inventory of any property
seized identifying the place where the property is being held.
*{&*}_

THIS WARRANT MAY BE SERVED DURING THE NIGHT TIME
HOURS.
THIS WARRANT MAY BE SERVED WITHOUT NOTICE OF PRIOR INTENT
OR AUTHORITY.

THIS WARRANT
ISSUANCE.

MUST BE SERVED WITHIN TEN

DATED this

£3S~^~-

(10) DAYS

day of June .2.00 0, jP*&7

FROM THE DATE OF

, 7?

5ISTRATE
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